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Abstract. It is often alleged that Cantor’s views about how the set theoretic 
universe as a  whole should be considered are fundamentally unclear. In this 
article we argue that Cantor’s views on this subject, at least up until around 
1896, are relatively clear, coherent, and interesting. We then go on to argue that 
Cantor’s views about the set theoretic universe as a  whole have implications 
for theology that have hitherto not been sufficiently recognised. However, the 
theological implications in question, at least as articulated here, would not have 
satisfied Cantor himself.
I. INTroDuCTIoN1
In Cantor’s philosophy of mathematics a connection is made between 
the mathematical universe2 considered as a  whole (the quantitative 
Absolute Infinite) and God. In this article we aim to investigate whether 
this contention is correct.
We will start by considering Cantor’s ontology and epistemology of 
sets, and the ways in which he felt that these were connected to the nature 
of God’s mind. Cantor essentially takes elements of Augustine’s view as 
a point of departure, and develops them in a distinctive and innovative 
way. Parallel to this, we will investigate the characteristics of God 
1 Thanks to Ignacio Jané and Christian Tapp for insightful comments.
2 In this paper, ‘mathematical universe’ and ‘set theoretic universe’ are interchangeable, 
as we are working from the viewpoint that set theory is foundational for mathematics. As 
such, any observation we make about the set theoretic universe can also be made about 
the mathematical universe.
118 JoANNA VAN Der VeeN & leoN HorSTeN
according to Cantor; similarities and connections between the two will 
become evident. This will then allow us to develop a Cantorian argument 
that derives theological conclusions from reasonable assumptions about 
the mathematical universe considered as a whole. Crucially, however, this 
argument is not Cantor’s own. It relies on non-19th century premises. In 
particular, the argument uses naturalistic assumptions about the nature 
of mathematical objects: it assumes certain ‘naïve’ commitments and 
beliefs that are implied by the practice of working mathematicians. When 
these are combined with more Cantorian elements (in particular, the 
existence of the set theoretic universe as a completed whole), significant 
theological implications can be derived; however, these implications fall 
short of establishing the existence of a personal God. To conclude, we 
will offer a defence of some of the assumptions crucial to the narrative – 
namely, those of naturalism and our distinctive conception of the set 
theoretic universe as a completed whole.
An important caveat must be made before beginning. We refer 
to ‘God’ throughout the article, but do not intend the term to be 
understood in the traditional theistic sense (unless otherwise implied by 
the context). Instead, we use the term loosely, allowing for the possibility 
of different sorts of religious perspectives – for example, deism or even 
pantheism. So, broadly speaking, we use the term to indicate something 
supernatural or ‘divine’.
II. CANTor’S mATHemATICAl oNToloGY AND ePISTemoloGY
In this section, we consider Cantor’s mathematical ontology and its 
related epistemology. In his writings, Cantor rarely clearly delineated 
his theological commitments from his mathematical ones and, as such, 
the following picture might appear obscure to many mathematicians. 
However, an understanding of how Cantor conceived of the mathematical 
universe will inform the (somewhat modernised) discussion that follows.
Kowalewski once commented that for Cantor the infinite cardinal 
numbers seemed ‘stepping stones to the throne of God’ (Kowalewski 
1950: 201). Indeed, Cantor writes that God lies ‘beyond the cardinal 
numbers’ (letter to Grace Chisholm-Young (1908), Cantor 1991: 454). 
The Cantorian picture seems to be one of the cardinal numbers converging 
to a  limit that lies beyond themselves, with that limit conceived of as 
‘God’. It is clear that Cantor thought that God could not be investigated 
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mathematically, being instead the subject of ‘speculative theology’ 
(Cantor 1932: 378). Therefore, the many remarks on the nature of God 
that one finds in Cantor’s mathematical-philosophical texts suggest that, 
whilst his notion of God is somehow connected with his theory of the 
transfinite and cardinal numbers, it is at the same time, at least to some 
extent, disconnected from mathematics.
Cantor was a lutheran with deep sympathies for the Catholic church, 
and his conception of the nature of God (which will be considered 
in more detail in section 3) is tied to the Christian philosophical-
theological tradition. on this subject, he primarily quotes philosophers 
and theologians, and this can lead to the impression that in this area 
Cantor had few original thoughts. This impression is unjustified, as we 
will see shortly.
Although Cantor held that the nature and properties of God cannot 
be investigated mathematically, his views on God were of crucial 
importance for his defence of his theory of the transfinite; he used his 
conception of God to motivate his conception of infinity in mathematics 
(specifically in set theory).
Cantor upheld the Augustinian view that mathematical entities such 
as numbers exist as ideas in the mind of God (letter to Jeiler (1895), 
Tapp 2005: 427, our translation):
The transfinite is capable of manifold formations, specifications, and 
individuations. In particular, there are transfinite cardinal numbers 
and transfinite ordinal types which, just as much as the finite numbers 
and forms, possess a definite mathematical uniformity, discoverable 
by men. All these particular modes of the transfinite have existed 
from eternity as ideas in the Divine intellect.
like Augustine (Augustine 2003: Ch. 18), he thought that the collection 
of the natural numbers is ‘in a certain sense’ finite for, and thus knowable 
by, God. However, Cantor extended Augustine's underdeveloped view 
in a revolutionary way. on the mathematical and epistemological side, 
Cantor claimed that the transfinite is knowable not only by God, but 
also by humans. Cantor's transfinite set theory shows how human 
mathematicians are able to calculate with transfinite numbers. on the 
philosophical and ontological side, Cantor developed Augustine’s sketchy 
view in a very original way. In a remarkable passage, Cantor articulates 
in detail how sets exist in the mind of God. The passage in question 
gives us a  unique insight into Cantor’s ontology and epistemology of 
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mathematics. We quote him here in full (Tapp 2005: 414-407, letter to 
Jeiler (1888), our translation):
God knows infinitely many things in reality and categorematically 
outside Himself (possible objects, objects that occur throughout the 
time series in the future), that admittedly do not always occur together 
on the side of the things, but that do have a  simultaneity in their 
being known in God’s Intellect. If only one would have convinced 
oneself always of this secure and unshakeable proposition in its full 
content (I mean, not just in general, but also in special and concrete 
cases), then one would have recognised in it without any trouble the 
truth of the transfinite, and millennia of disputes and errors would 
have been avoided.
If we now apply this proposition to a special class of objects of God’s 
intellect, then we arrive at the elements (elementary propositions) of 
the theory of infinite numbers and order types.
every single finite cardinal number (1 or 2 or 3, etc) is contained in 
God’s Intellect both as an exemplary idea, and as a unitary form of 
knowledge of countless compound objects, to which the cardinal 
number applies: all finite cardinal numbers are therefore distinctly 
and simultaneously present in God’s mind (Augustine 2003: book 
XII, chapter 19: ‘Against those, who say that, what is infinite, can also 
not be comprehended by God’s knowledge’).3
They build in their totality a manifold, unified, and from the other 
contents of God’s Intellect separated thing in itself, that itself forms 
an object of God’s Knowledge. but since the knowledge of a  thing 
presupposes a unitary form, by which this thing exists and is known, 
there must in God’s intellect be a  determinate cardinal number 
available, which relates itself to the collection or totality of all finite 
cardinals in the same way as the number 7 relates itself to the notes 
in an octave.
For this, which can be shown to be the smallest transfinite cardinal 
number, I have chosen the sign w.
on the other hand the finite cardinal numbers 1, 2, 3, ... form in their 
natural order a well-ordered collection [...]; the general form, under 
which this well-ordered collection of all finite cardinal numbers 
is necessarily conceived by God’s Intellect (on reflection on them 
3 Cantor is in fact referring to the content of chapter 18 rather than of chapter 19 here.
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belonging to the ordering that I have just described), I call the ordinal 
number of this well-ordered collection, or its order type, and I signify 
it with w; here, too, it can easily be shown that w  is the smallest 
transfinite ordinal number.
When we abstract in w from the ordering of its elements (which are 
then just units), then we will naturally obtain the cardinal number 
that we have denoted above by w.
This is to explain my notation; the bar over4 the w  should remind 
of the abstraction from the ordering of the elements in the cardinal 
number w; one can say, that the cardinal number w originates from 
the ordinal number w, when we abstract in the latter from the 
ordering of the units that are contained in it.
The picture that emerges is the following. Finite cardinal numbers, 
and even ‘small transfinite numbers’ such as N0 and N1,5 are obtained 
by a process of abstraction from groupings in the physical world. This 
process of abstraction should not be conceived of as a human form of 
creation; instead, humans discover numbers as abstracta from groupings 
that have existed for all eternity in the mind of God. The same holds 
for ordinal numbers. They exist in the mind of God as abstracta of 
configurations in the world under the aspect of an ordering relation. 
When humans have knowledge of sets, they stand in cognitive contact 
with these mathematical forms in the mind of God.6
Cantor does not claim that cardinalities larger than N1, are instantiated 
in the material world, and consequently it cannot be assumed that all 
cardinalities exist in God's mind as abstractions from groupings of 
material entities in the world.7 but if the natural numbers themselves 
form a set in the mind of God, and all subcollections of natural numbers 
likewise form sets in the mind of God, then these entities themselves form 
a well-delineated totality in the mind of God, from which a number can 
then be abstracted (2 N0). We can then repeat this process; in this way, all 
cardinalities (finite and transfinite) are instantiated in the mind of God, 
and so exist as numbers in the mind of God.
4 We have used bars under the digits instead of above them; the meaning is the same
5 Cantor believed that the material atoms form a countably infinite set, and that the 
ether particles form a  smallest uncountable set (Cantor 1991: 224, letter to mittag-
leffler (1884)).
6 benacerraf (1973) asks searching questions about the nature of this cognitive 
relation. However, a discussion of this problem exceeds the scope of the current article.
7 Similarly for ordinal numbers.
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This conception of Cantor's ontology of sets helps to elucidate 
another comment made in the above passage, viz. that cardinal and 
ordinal numbers exist in God's mind in two ways: as unitary forms and 
as exemplary ideas.8 This ‘double existence’ of mathematical entities in 
God’s mind can potentially be understood in two ways:
(1) Numbers exist as two different entities in the mind of God.
(2) They exist as only one entity, but this entity has two different 
aspects.
Cantor seems to lean towards the first option in the quoted passage. 
under this conception, the number one, for instance, exists as a ‘unitary 
form’ that is an abstractum from concrete unities in the world. but this 
unitary form can itself be seen as a very special singleton: the singleton 
of the number one. The latter object is an exemplary idea, a  special 
instantiation of the unitary form. Similarly, the number 2 is instantiated 
in a very special idea in the mind of God as the set {1, 2}. The ordinal 
w exists in an exemplary way as the ordered sequence < 1, 2, ... >, and 
when we abstract from the ordering we obtain the exemplary way in 
which the first infinite cardinal number exists. Continuing in this way, the 
ordinal number w+w is instantiated in a very special way as the ordered 
sequence < 1, 2, ...  w, w+1, ... >, and so on. In general, Cantor's two 
generating principles guarantee the exemplary existence of all ordinal 
and cardinal numbers in the mind of God.9 observe that, of course, the 
ordinal number w+w also exists in 'non-exemplary ways' – for instance 
as the ordered sequence < w, w+1, ... 1, 2, ... >.
All these mathematical 'forms' taken together form the quantitatively 
Absolutely Infinite. This follows from an unrestricted fusion principle 
(not mentioned by Cantor) which says that any plurality of objects 
taken together form a compound object (Niebergall 2012: 277). In the 
metaphysical literature, this principle is mostly applied to concrete objects, 
but it can likewise be applied in the abstract realm. metaphysicians tend 
to assume unrestricted fusion for objects10 and – as we are considering 
sets as objects – we do not find it unreasonable to apply the same such 
principles to our own enterprise. The compound object made up by all 
the mathematical forms must then be ‘the biggest infinity’.
8 Thanks to Ignacio Jané for helping us understand this aspect of Cantor’s view.
9 For a  discussion of Cantor’s generating principles, see (Hallett 1984: chapter 2, 
section 2.1).
10 See (Niebergall 2012: 276).
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Nonetheless, as far as Cantor is concerned, all the mathematical 
forms cannot together form one well-delineated totality in the mind 
of God from which a  number can be abstracted. Cantor does not 
philosophically spell out why this is so, but he rightly states that he 
never claimed that a  number can be assigned to the collection of all 
cardinal (or ordinal) numbers. of course, later in his life Cantor did 
know why, at least in a  mathematical sense  – it is a  consequence of 
russell’s Paradox, i.e., of Cantor’s own diagonal argument. However, this 
mathematical insight does not have a parallel philosophical-theological 
one – for, from the Augustinian point of view, it does seem that the set 
theoretic universe constitutes a  (well-delineated) part of God’s mind. 
As such, the Quantitative Absolute Infinity of the complete set theoretic 
universe does not appear to sit completely comfortably within Cantor’s 
metaphysical picture.
What Cantor should have said (but did not) on this last point is the 
following. The mathematical realm is indeed a  well-delineated part 
of the mind of God. but there is much else beside sets in the mind of 
God. Thus the question of in what sense the quantitatively Absolutely 
Infinite is the ‘biggest infinity’ indeed arises. The quantitative extent of 
the infinity of God is expressed exhaustively in the mathematical part 
of the mind of God and so, in agreement with von Neumann’s principle 
that all proper classes are ‘equally large’, the whole of God’s mind is in 
one-to-one onto correspondence with its mathematical part. Thus the 
set theoretic universe (V) is indeed the ‘biggest infinity’, and we have 
some philosophical understanding of why that is so.
An underlying assumption that has been made throughout the 
foregoing discussion is that the mathematical universe is unique – in other 
words, that when we speak of the ‘mathematical universe’ (equivalently, 
the set theoretic universe) there is exactly one thing that lies within the 
extension of such a description. Though this is an arguably contentious 
point in modern philosophy of mathematics, it is outside the scope of the 
present topic, and as such we will not discuss it further here.11
III. CHArACTerISTICS oF GoD ACCorDING To CANTor
It is blindingly obvious from the preceding discussion that Cantor saw 
a connection between his work on infinity and his concept of God. We 
11 For one form which this discussion can take, see the debate between (balaguer 
1995) and (martin 2001).
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will now consider several specific characteristics that Cantor conceived 
of God as having that are distinct from the above and which, if accepted, 
will form an independent motivation for the stipulation of a connection 
between set theory and theology. This sort of exposition has already been 
done fruitfully by Christian Tapp (see (Tapp 2005) and (Tapp 2012)) and 
also to some extent by Adam Drozdek (see Drozdek 1995), and we draw 
heavily on their work here.
Cantor’s divine attributes include absolute freedom (letter to 
Franzelin (1886), Cantor 1991: 258; Cantor 1932: 406), absolute goodness 
(Tapp 2005: 326), absolute omnipotence (Tapp 2005: 326) and absolute 
wisdom (Tapp 2005: 326). ‘Absolute’ here could (and we suggest should) 
be read as having a more technical definition than commonly used, one 
that is understood by considering its latin roots. Tapp does this in (Tapp 
2012: section 2). ‘Absolute’ in latin is absolutum, which comes from 
the root absolvere, meaning to detach or disassociate. So, in essence, 
what predicating a  quality (such as freedom) with ‘absolute’ does (for 
Cantor) is detach it from limitations. This might seem superfluous for 
the divine attributes  – after all, is not the very nature of ‘freedom’ to 
be detached from limitations? However, he really does mean something 
stronger here; whilst describing a human as ‘free’ might simply denote 
that person’s autonomy regarding their life decisions (to marry who they 
like, for example), when it is applied (absolutely) to God it means that He 
can literally do whatever He likes – even transcend the laws of physics 
(something impossible for a human).
When explicated in this way, it becomes clearer why there might be 
a connection between theological questions and infinity. Infinity is, in 
a  sense, beyond limitations. Pre-theoretical notions of infinity tend to 
be of the point beyond which we can no longer ‘count’; it is outside the 
limits of the mathematical objects we can sensically work with. of course, 
much of advanced mathematics does work with infinity, and Cantor’s 
mathematics even involves completed infinities (for example, transfinite 
numbers). However, we argue that there is nonetheless a parallel with this 
pre-theoretic notion of ‘beyond limitations’, and this is due to Cantor’s 
absolutely infinite (informally, the ‘biggest’ infinity).12 The absolutely 
infinite is limited only by itself – it is the domain of all other infinities 
and is thus in a sense a fixed object that is nonetheless unboundedly large. 
12 For a discussion of the relation between Cantor’s notion of Absolute and the use of 
the term ‘Absolute’ in the history of metaphysics, see (Hauser 2011).
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God, as sketched above, is a ‘being’ of fixed characteristics, but each of 
these he possesses in unbounded and yet maximum measure. The only 
restrictions that can be placed on absolute infinity or on God come from 
themselves. The similarity between these two conceptions provides some 
motivation for attempting to uncover a parallel or connection between 
Cantorian infinities and some notion of God (Cantorian or otherwise). 
Another attribute of God which we can arguably extrapolate from 
Cantor’s conception, and which will become crucial later, is that God is 
beyond human understanding:
I  have never assumed a  ‘Genus Supremum’ of the actual infinite. 
Quite on the contrary I have proved that there can be no such ‘Genus 
Supremum’ of the actual infinite. What lies beyond all that is finite and 
transfinite is not a ‘Genus’; it is the unique, completely individual unity, 
in which everything is, which comprises everything, the `Absolute’, for 
human intelligence unfathomable, also that not subject to mathematics, 
unmeasurable, the ‘ens simplicissimum’, the ‘Actus purissimus’, which is 
by many called ‘God’. (letter to Grace Chisholm-Young (1908), Cantor 
1991: 454, our translation).13
An independent and informal argument for the thesis that God exceeds 
human comprehension runs as follows. If God were understood by 
humans, then He would be limited by something outside Himself. From 
the preceding paragraph we know that God is only limited by Himself. 
Therefore, God could not possibly be understood by humans. The 
first premise of this argument requires support. Humans are outside 
of God (because they are created), and are also finite in their capacity 
of understanding. Therefore their intelligence (i.e. what they can 
understand) has an upper bound. So if we were to understand God, then 
he would have to ‘lie within’ this boundary. This would be a  form of 
limitation, which, if we accept the foregoing, is impossible. So, in sum, 
the absoluteness of God’s infinity is beyond our understanding.
So transcending human understanding can be taken to be a distinctive 
feature of God; this both squares with what we know about Cantor’s view 
and is independently compelling (if one is already sold on the idea of 
13 Another passage that conveys the same message is the following: ‘The Transfinite 
points [...] with necessity to an Absolute that cannot in any way be diminished, and that 
is therefore to be looked upon quantitatively as an absolute maximum. In a certain sense 
it transcends human power of comprehension, and in particular is beyond mathematical 
determination.’ (Cantor 1932: 405)
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a divine entity). This particular attribute is also given further support by 
the fact that it is traditionally taken to be a fundamental property that 
sets God apart from everything else in creation (negative theology).
Section 2 of this paper has already suggested Cantor’s own version of 
this view – that the set theoretic universe as a whole (V) is a part of God that 
is too vast for human comprehension (and if a part is incomprehensible, 
then it stands to reason that the whole is too). However, he did qualify 
this to some extent. Whilst repeatedly stressing that the Absolutely 
Infinite exceeds ‘mathematical determination’, he leaves room for the 
hypothesis that another kind of understanding of the Absolutely Infinite 
can be obtained. As mentioned before, he says that the investigation of 
the Absolutely Infinite is the province of ‘speculative theology’. We will 
have more to say later about Cantor’s concept of speculative theology. let 
it suffice for now to note that according to the standard view theology 
differs from philosophy in that it takes the Scripture as given in much 
the same way as empirical science takes empirical observations and the 
outcomes of experiments as given.
We argue that, as such, the possibility of understanding the divine 
through speculative theology is not a threat to our claim that the divine 
is fundamentally outside the remit of human understanding. The 
support for this claim has two parts. Such a form of understanding takes 
the Scripture (or some other sort of religious basis) as given, whereas we 
are aiming to take nothing ‘theological’ as given, and to work towards 
a  theological conclusion using only the rules of reason and acceptable 
premises. Therefore the potential insight given by speculative theology 
is distinct from the sort of insights that our current conception of 
‘human understanding’ might include. Furthermore, as we have already 
mentioned, theology and science have distinct methodologies, and so 
lead to different forms of understanding; in this paper, we are concerned 
with the sort of understanding given by the latter. Consequently, even 
if Cantor is correct in his claim that God can be understood (to some 
extent, and in some specific sense) through speculative theology, we are 
still legitimately able to claim that a distinctive feature of God is being 
beyond human understanding.
IV. THe SeT THeoreTIC uNIVerSe AND THe eXISTeNCe oF GoD
In this section, we bring together the ideas we have outlined so far in 
order to construct an argument (which will be split into two subsidiary 
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arguments) to the conclusion that some sort of divine entity exists. We 
again stress that such an argument is not Cantor’s own; crucially, it falls 
short of establishing a Christian God – or in fact any sort of personal 
God. We will endeavour to assess both the arguments and whether the 
conclusion that they might establish, mitigated as it is, is still significant.
4.1 Two Arguments
before combining the ingredients that we have discussed to construct an 
argument for the existence of God, we derive a subsidiary conclusion – 
that the mathematical universe is an aspect of God. This, combined with 
some assumptions about set theoretic ontology and mereology, will 
be sufficient to create a valid argument; soundness will be investigated 
afterwards. Very roughly, the proposed reasoning for the subsidiary 
conclusion goes as follows:
Premise 1 Anything that exceeds human understanding is an aspect 
of God.
Premise 2 The mathematical universe exceeds human understanding.
Conclusion The mathematical universe is an aspect of God.
If this argument is accepted then, if we can also conclude that the 
mathematical universe exists, we can conclude that some sort of God 
exists (because part of God does). We now argue that the mathematical 
universe does exist:
Premise 1’ Sets exist (in a platonic sense)
Premise 2’ If a  plurality of entities (such as sets) exist, then taken 
together they form a completed (mereological) whole
Conclusion’  The set theoretic universe (equivalently, the mathematical 
universe) exists
We take it for granted that this argument is valid – as we have taken the 
set theoretic universe to be nothing but the fusion of all individual sets 
(see the end of section 2). In the next section, we turn to a consideration 
of the soundness of both arguments, denoting the first ‘Argument 1’ and 
the second ‘Argument 2’. We will neither unconditionally endorse nor 
reject the premises of these two arguments; we shall merely argue that 
each of them has received enough support in the literature for it to be 
unreasonable to reject the arguments out of hand as unsound.
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4.1.1 Argument 2
Premise 1’ is an extremely contentious point in the philosophy of 
mathematics. A thorough consideration of it is beyond the scope of this 
article  – books could, and indeed have, been written both in defence 
and in criticism of mathematical platonism. For our current purposes 
we shall content ourselves with saying that, in light of the naturalist 
stance that we have chosen to adopt, such a  premise is supported by 
mathematical practice; as bernays says, every working mathematician is 
a platonist (bernays 1935). So mathematical practice, combined with our 
specific sort of naturalism, provides ample support for this premise.
We have remarked before that Premise 2’, on the other hand, is 
a mereological claim that is widely held in metaphysical circles and, as 
such, is not greatly controversial.14 Indeed, the completed existence of 
the whole of the set theoretic universe supervenes on the completed 
existence of the components (in this case, the sets).
However, both these premises are susceptible to criticism, especially 
if a naturalistic position (in the philosophy of maths) is rejected. After 
all, it is coherent to reject the claim that our best mathematical ontology 
can be read off from what mathematicians commit themselves to in 
their practice. mathematical naturalism can even be accepted whilst 
denying the premises in question. However, if this line of criticism were 
adopted, it would follow that the commitments of mathematicians are 
not straightforwardly readable from their practice and, as such, that the 
surface structure of informal mathematical speech is not the same as 
its deep logical structure.15 This in itself constitutes a mark against such 
a position. moreover, such a view creates a host of other problems for 
the philosopher of mathematics;16 for the purposes of this article, we will 
take this as substantial grounds for retaining naturalism and Premise 1.
However, it is also possible to accept the first premise but reject the 
second; for example, Zermelo conceived of the set theoretic universe 
as a  potentially infinite series of actually infinite ‘normal domains’ 
(Zermelo 1930). It has even been argued that from 1896 onwards Cantor 
himself was well on his way to Zermelo’s viewpoint (see, for example, 
Jané 1995).17 This is often taken to be a more sophisticated position than 
14 David lewis has famously championed the principle of unrestricted fusion that 
entails it. Nonetheless, his view has been challenged by van Inwagen (van Inwagen 1994).
15 See, for example, Hellman’s position in (Hellman 1989).
16 For a discussion of this, see (burgess and rosen 1999).
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that of Cantor but, again, adopting this position involves not taking set 
theoretic practice completely at face value. mathematicians (set theorists) 
do talk about V as if it is an entity.17
Cantor himself thought (in typical 19th century vein) that the 
second premise could be proved from prior grounds. His so-called 
‘domain principle’ states that every variation of a parameter presupposes 
an underlying fixed domain over which the parameter varies (Hallett 
1984: 7). Since in Zermelo’s picture the ‘normal domains’ somehow 
vary (‘grow’), there must be a  completed domain over which they do 
this. This domain is, of course, the completed quantitatively Absolutely 
Infinite (V). These points will be returned to in greater detail later. but 
it is important to observe that, given naturalism, we need not commit 
ourselves to the domain principle for the argument to carry through.
Taking these two premises together, we get to the conclusion that the 
set theoretic universe (V) exists as a completed whole. This conclusion, 
aside from being the result of a  valid and arguably sound argument, 
is also supported by mathematical practice. If one takes set theoretic 
practice at face value, then there does seem to be a commitment to V 
and other proper classes as completed wholes. After all, many (perhaps 
most) set theory textbooks contain class forming operations of the form 
{x|f(x)}18 – it is just that they are very careful about the way that they are 
handled! In informal argumentation, set theorists have no compunction 
at all about speaking of the class of the ordinals, for instance. In sum, it 
is fair to say that we can rely on mathematical practice to assume that, 
for any definable condition of sets, there is a  class (but crucially, not 
necessarily a set) corresponding to it containing those sets that meet the 
condition in question.
4.1.2 Argument 1
We now turn to the soundness of Argument 1. Premise 2 has been 
established to some extent by the initial part of this article, but still 
requires some additional elucidation and support.
The set theoretic universe is known to be beyond the grasp of set 
theoretic principles as a  result of Cantor’s diagonal lemma. However, 
this is not enough to conclude that it is beyond the grasp of human 
understanding. In order to establish such a  thing, we would need to 
17 Jané later qualified this judgement: see (Jané 2010).
18 See for instance (Drake 1974: 3).
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assume that the set theoretic universe’s governing principles are those of 
set theory, which we will take to be the principles of Zermelo-Fraenkel 
set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC). Thus we need to support 
the implicit assumption that such a  set theory is our most general 
rational theory of pluralities of sets (as we are conceiving of the set 
theoretic universe as a plurality of its constituent parts – namely, the 
plurality of all sets). The claim is essentially that, if some pluralities are 
not subject to the principles of ZFC, then these collections cannot really 
be rationally understood.
This is not entirely compelling. We have already seen that Cantor 
thought it possible that some non-mathematical insight into V as 
a completed Absolutely Infinite was possible. However, he was completely 
silent about what the nature of such an insight could be, and even 
suggested it was as much a matter of revelation as of real understanding – 
a  matter which we have already discussed in section 3. A  more 
threatening challenge to the assumption that ZFC is the best theory we 
have to understand V is to propose an alternative theory which does 
give us a mathematical understanding of proper classes: Von Neumann-
bernays-Gödel set theory (NbG).19 However, such a  claim could be 
challenged by replying that NbG does not really give us a treatment of 
proper classes as entities; it is no more than an acknowledgement that to 
every condition of sentences, a class corresponds that contains precisely 
those sets as elements that meet the condition. So NbG does not give 
us a mathematical understanding of classes. Indeed, most set theorists 
object to taking proper classes seriously because set theory is our most 
general theory of collections. We shall not go into this issue in any further 
depth here, but will return to the idea of NbG in section 5.
This, then, is how we interpret Cantor’s famous dictum:
The Absolute can only be acknowledged, but never known, nor even 
approximately known. (Cantor 1932: 205)
We cannot have a  rational (mathematical) understanding of God; but 
we do have a rationally compelling argument establishing the existence 
of God.
We now turn our attention to Premise 1, which requires further 
defence. We have established that it is reasonable to claim that God 
exceeds human understanding, but not explicitly that anything that 
19 or even the stronger class theory morse-Kelly (mK).
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exceeds human understanding is an aspect of God. We will not offer any 
sort of formal argumentation to this conclusion here; however, the next 
subsection will offer some defence of such a claim.
4.1.3 The Last Step
Cantor himself was happy to take the last step  – i.e. to regard the 
(humanly incomprehensible) proper classes as part of something that 
fundamentally and maximally transcends us: God.
As far as the discussion here has gone, the arguments we are considering 
do seem to establish (if they are sound) the existence of a completed set 
theoretic universe that, as an entity, fundamentally transcends human 
understanding – and there is a venerable tradition of identifying God 
with that which maximally transcends human understanding.20 before 
considering more thoroughly whether such a tradition is justified, it is 
worth briefly considering whether there are other phenomena (within 
the mathematical sphere) which also surpass human understanding. If 
there are, considerable doubt would be shed upon Premise 1.21
Two potential candidates for this are contradictions and (tokens 
of) the multiplication of huge numbers. We claim that neither example 
poses a  real threat to our claims. For example, contradictions are not 
beyond human understanding because, instead of being unintelligible, 
they are simply necessarily false. The multiplication of extremely large 
numbers may exceed human understanding in practice (i.e. we could not 
practicably carry out such multiplications), but not in principle. We have 
the methods to carry them out and could carry them out whilst remaining 
finite beings; we would just need certain adjustments  – for example, 
more memory space and longer life spans. The crucial point is that such 
adjustments would always leave us within the finite (and, correspondingly, 
human) sphere. Though we will not offer more discussion of this issue 
here, we believe all similar proposed counterexamples can be dealt with 
along the same lines. Therefore, we do not have an excess of examples of 
things that exceed human understanding and, as such, no initial doubt 
is cast on the claim that anything that exceeds human understanding is 
an aspect of God.
So, if it is true that God can be identified with that which maximally 
transcends human understanding, our arguments do seem to entail that 
20 See (Drozdek 1995).
21 Thanks to Christian Tapp for drawing our attention to the need for this elucidation.
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V is somehow a  part of the Divine. Nonetheless, it could be objected 
that such a conclusion tells us little else about the Divine. For example, 
it is a  long way removed from establishing the existence of a personal 
God. Cantor himself saw his work as a  means of bringing people to 
‘rational theism’ (letter to Hermite (1894), Cantor 1991: 124-125). but 
the argument that we have offered falls short of a theistic conclusion, and 
we see no means of adapting the argument to reach it. To establish this, 
something more would be needed (perhaps an appeal to the bible).
In view of this, it might be argued that it is misleading to say that 
the arguments, taken together, establish the existence of God. This 
seems fair enough. Yet it is worth noting that the more minimalist 
conception of God adopted in this paper is somewhat in keeping with 
the properties attributed to potential divine entities in section 3. There 
we claimed that God exceeds human understanding and that, if anything 
were to be a  fundamental characteristic attributable to a divine entity, 
that would be it. It would be unusual (though of course not impossible) 
for something else to possess a  quality fundamental to God, and thus 
it seems compelling to suggest that anything that surpasses human 
understanding is (at least a part of) God. This is – again – not a formal 
or watertight defence of our decision to identify God with that which 
transcends human understanding, but we feel that it at least goes some 
way to establishing such an identification’s legitimacy.
It is also worth mentioning another way in which our ‘God’ diverges 
from the traditional conception. This is that, upon our account, we have 
no assurance of God’s ‘goodness’; to put it in a (perhaps oversimplified) 
way, the divine entity our arguments, if sound and valid, would establish 
could just as viably be ‘Satan’ as God. However, this is not an issue for 
us. As our caveat at the end of the introduction stated, we use ‘God’ to 
refer to any sort of divine entity. As a result, such a differentiation is not 
relevant to us.
4.1.4 Why Care?
let us for the moment reject the objections to the soundness of the 
arguments presented and suppose that our proposed responses to them 
are accepted. In this case, it seems that the arguments must be basically 
sound. The arguments in themselves are certainly not very complicated, 
and so it seems that something like them must have occurred to 
theologians, philosophers, mathematicians, and indeed maybe even to 
Cantor himself, at some point. Indeed, at least in embryonic form, the 
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argument that we have tried to spell out in some detail has appeared in 
the literature:
Cantor joins Augustine in theological pronouncements and  – as far 
as mathematics allows him – he also shows that it is a mathematically 
proven fact. There is no set of all sets, the number of infinities surpasses 
any number. This fact can be used by theologians [to show] that God 
simply must surpass all infinities and in this sense he is not infinite – he 
is the Absolute. (Drozdek 1995: 139)
This leads to the question of why such arguments have not been 
investigated and discussed in any detail before. We consider briefly why 
this might be the case, but claim that they are nonetheless still of merit – 
especially for philosophers.
The most likely reason that theologians have not been interested in 
such argumentation is that  – as articulated before  – the existence of 
a personal God is not established by it – and a personal God would be of 
the most interest to them.
mathematicians (and in particular set theorists) are only interested 
in what is subject to the laws of mathematics. V, at least as far as the 
arguments at hand are concerned, falls outside the scope of this, even 
if its existence has to be acknowledged to some extent in mathematical 
practice. As such, strictly speaking, conclusions that can be derived from 
a consideration of V are outside the remit of their interests.
Cantor himself did not articulate such arguments. The reason seems 
to be that for him platonism about sets (Premise 1) is derived from prior 
premises of a philosophical and / or theological nature:
[...] a relation analogous to that between theology and metaphysics can 
be ascertained to hold between on the one hand the latter (metaphysics) 
and on the other hand mathematics and the other natural sciences. The 
foundation of the principles of mathematics and the natural sciences is 
the responsibility of metaphysics; she must therefore regard them both 
as her children and as her servants and helpmates, which she cannot 
afford to lose out of sight but instead must always guard and control, 
and which must produce from the wide scope of the material and mental 
realm the building blocks with which her palace can be completed, like 
the queen bee residing in her apiaries sends out thousands of bees into 
the garden to suck nectar from the flowers and then together and under 
her supervision transform it into honey. (Cantor, letter to esser (1896), 
Tapp 2005: 308-309, our translation)
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It is for this reason that Cantor takes recourse to ideas from Augustinian 
theology. In other words, he rejects the mathematical naturalistic stance 
that has become popular since the work of philosophers such as Gödel, 
Quine, Putnam and others and, in essence, works backwards from theism 
to platonism. We, in contrast to Cantor, take platonism to be grounded 
in mathematical practice. more precisely, it can be inferred from 
mathematical practice by inference to the best explanation (essentially 
an indispensability argument).22 Cantor would also have objected to our 
minimalist conception of God: he upheld the idea of a  personal God 
and in fact rebelled vehemently when he was charged with pantheism 
(letters to Franzelin (1886), Cantor 1991: 254-258), and he also objected 
to deism. He insisted on a conception of God that does not leave deism 
or pantheism viable possibilities.
In light of this, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, if 
the premises hold, the arguments do establish something. They are non-
circular: the existence of something that exceeds the limits of human 
intelligibility is derived rather than presupposed. As such, it seems that 
philosophers at least should be interested: philosophers follow arguments 
where they lead as long as the conclusions are significant, even if they fall 
short of what theologians are interested in. Henceforth, we shall refer to 
the philosophical position which we have adopted as the ‘naïve stance’ 
(for obvious reasons), and shall give reasons for preferring it to arguably 
more sophisticated views.
V. THe NAÏVe STANCe
We have seen that from certain ‘sophisticated’ philosophical perspectives, 
one or more of our premises can be challenged. We have not refuted the 
challenges from these perspectives, and nor do we think we could: the 
perspectives are wholly coherent. Nonetheless, there are reasons for pre-
ferring the naïve naturalistic attitude that we have adopted in this article.
Firstly, as we saw earlier, the platonism that it involves is the ontological 
stance that mathematicians implicitly adopt in their practice. It is also 
heuristically immensely fruitful, as is universally acknowledged. even 
the ‘working mathematician’ who does not, upon reflection, endorse the 
platonistic stance that she adopts in her mathematical working hours 
22 For a discussion of indispensability arguments in the philosophy of mathematics, 
see (Colyvan 2011).
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will recognise that it is in practice impossible to do mathematics without 
adopting the naïve stance.
Secondly, one can formulate a class theoretic reflection principle that 
expresses that V is ineffable in a very specific sense (Welch and Horsten 
2012). The principle in question states, roughly, that V is second order 
elementary equivalent to some set sized initial segment Vk,23 in the sense 
that every second-order formula is true in V with all its proper classes 
if and only if it is true in the structure <Vk, Vk+1, e>. This principle is 
called the Global Reflection Principle (GrP). It can be shown that if 
GrP is added to a weak (set theoretic conservative) class theory such as 
a fragment of NbG, strong large cardinal consequences follow.24 At the 
same time, the theory NbG+GrP can be shown to be set theoretically 
sound from certain large cardinal axioms (the axiom of subcompact 
cardinals). Thus it seems right to say that the mathematically Absolutely 
Infinite is mathematically unknowable in a  very fundamental sense.25 
And this class theoretic reflection principle can only be formulated 
against the background of a class theory (such as NbG) in which V is 
recognised to exist. Thus we can extend the scope of the indispensability 
argument from sets to proper classes. The outcome is that support is 
given to the claim that the set-theoretic universe exists as a mereological 
whole of all individual sets.
The global reflection principle is a principle about V. We have argued 
that it is true. Thus it could be objected that it seems that, after all, it is 
possible for us to have some mathematical (rational) knowledge of V 
after all; as such, it would be an exaggeration to say that we can have no 
knowledge about the about the Absolutely Infinite at all. However, GrP 
does say that a certain kind of knowledge can never be had of V. We have 
to acknowledge that it is not a set, but at the same time we cannot know 
any proposition of it that, when relativized to any initial segment Va 
would be false. This is enough, we submit, to claim that V fundamentally 
exceeds human comprehension.
The derivation of these large cardinal consequences (i.e. the existence 
of unboundedly many Woodin cardinals) from GrP is currently the 
only way of providing intrinsic support for them. but it seems that 
GrP is most straightforwardly motivated against the background of 
23 Vk is the set of those sets of ordinal rank smaller than k.24 In particular, NbG+GrP entails the existence of unboundedly many Woodin 
cardinals.
25 This argumentative move is an instance of Inference to the best explanation.
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an actualist platonist stance about sets and proper classes.26 This is, we 
submit, testimony to the fruitfulness of the naïve stance that we have 
adopted in this article.
VI. mATHemATICS, meTAPHYSICS, AND THeoloGY
The initial part of this paper was dedicated to supporting the claim that, 
contrary to popular opinion, Cantor had a largely coherent and defensible 
view of how the set theoretic universe as a whole should be considered. 
His conception of such a universe was not restricted to the mathematical 
sphere; for Cantor, the domains of discourse of mathematics and 
theology were thoroughly intertwined:
[...] the unbreakable bond that connects metaphysics with theology; 
where on the one hand the latter is the lodestar to which the former 
directs itself and from which it receives its light, when the natural and 
ordinary lights fail; on the other hand, theology needs for its scientific 
development and for its representation the whole of philosophy, 
which therefore stands to it in a  subservient relationship. This has 
three consequences: a), that theology inevitably is a  participant in 
any metaphysical discussion; b), that any real progress in metaphysics 
also strengthens or multiplies the tools of theology, indeed, in certain 
circumstances can lead human reason [...] with respects to mysteries of 
faith to deeper, more contentful symbolic insight than could have been 
expected or suspected beforehand. (letter to esser (1896), Tapp 2005: 
308, our translation)
moreover, Cantor, contrary to what we would say today, classifies his 
own work in set theory as metaphysics (in a subsequent letter to esser 
from 1896):
The general theory of manifolds [...] belongs entirely to metaphysics. You 
can easily convince yourself from this, when you examine the categories 
of cardinal number and ordinal type, these fundamental concepts of set 
theory, with respect to the degree of their generality and besides will 
remark, that in them thought is completely pure, so that there is not even 
the least scope for the imagination to play a role. This is not altered in the 
least by the images, to which I, like all metaphysicians, from time to time 
help myself, and also the fact that the works of my pen are published in 
26 An attempt to motivate GrP without assuming that the concept of set and of proper 
class are instantiated is given in (Welch and Horsten 2012: section 7).
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mathematical journals, does not modify the metaphysical content and 
character of them. (Tapp 2005: 309-310, our translation)
This leaves the reader of Cantor’s works with a mixture of mathematical, 
metaphysical and theological elements that are related to each other in 
complicated and at times confusing ways. For this reason, it is not easy 
to find a  coherent rational argumentative structure in Cantor’s views. 
Nonetheless, we have attempted to do this, paying especial attention to 
his characterisation of the mathematical universe, his conception of the 
divine, and the similarities between the two.
We then attempted to use Cantor’s insights into the parallels between 
the Absolutely Infinite and God to construct a rational argument for the 
existence of some sort of divine entity. Whereas Cantor worked from 
a theological standpoint to mathematical platonism, we have attempted 
to motivate a theological standpoint upon the assumption that mathe-
matical platonism is correct. our arguments, if sound, establish the 
existence of a divine entity – but crucially fall short of establishing the 
personal ‘God’ one might hope for. The ‘God’ that they establish is more 
akin to a pantheistic one, identified to some extent (or in part) with the 
mathematical universe.
We acknowledge that our arguments rely heavily on the acceptance 
of controversial premises and concepts. mathematical platonism is often 
especially unpalatable to philosophers; the Cantorian actualist conception 
of the mathematical universe is unpalatable to many mathematicians and 
philosophers; a minimalist conception of God (compatible with deism or 
pantheism) is unsatisfactory to most theologians. Nonetheless, we believe 
that the arguments we have proposed are interesting and fruitful avenues 
to go down, whoever you are and whether you agree with them or not.
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